

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 15733

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV XF US
SUBJECT: PROPOSED SCENARIO FOR LONDON MIDDLE EAST
- TALKS - MEETING WITH SADAT

REF: (A) ALEXANDRIA 0468 (B) CAIRO 15709
- (C) STATE 159179 (D) STATE 161615

1. SUMMARY. IN MEETING WITH SADAT, MUBARAK AND KAMEL TODAY IN ALEXANDRIA, I BRIEFED THE PRESIDENT ON OUR PROPOSED SCENARIO. KAMEL HAD ALREADY TOLD HIM ABOUT OUR TALK OF YESTERDAY. SADAT SAID PRINCIPLE OF A KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING STILL AGREEABLE, BUT HE DID NOT WISH GIVE DEFINITIVE ANSWER TO OUR SCENARIO TODAY. UPON REFLECTION, HE HAD AGREED WITH KAMEL'S VIEW THAT SUCH A DIRECT MEETING COMING RIGHT AFTER THE NEGATIVE ISRAELI RESPONSES POSES PROBLEMS. ENTIRE WORLD DISTURBED BY ISRAELI ANSWERS AND VIEWS THEM AS NEGATIVE. SOME DRAMATIC "IN-BETWEEN" STEP NEEDED TO GIVE NEW MOMENTUM TO PEACE PROCESS AND PROVIDE PEG ON WHICH TO HANG GOE AGREEMENT TO SUCH A MEETING. NOTING PRESIDENT CARTER WILL BE IN BONN BETWEEN JULY 13 AND 27, SADAT WONDERED IF BEFORE, DURING OR AFTER THAT PERIOD A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND PRESIDENT CARTER MIGHT BE
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ARRANGED IN, SAY, SALZBURG OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN EUROPE. HE WAS SURE THAT HE COULD ARRANGE WITH KREISKY THAT REQUISITE INVITATIONS BE ISSUED. OUTCOME OF SUCH MEETING COULD BE SADAT'S AGREEMENT, AT PRESIDENT CARTER'S BEHEST, TO HAVE KAMEL MEET WITH DAYAN IN LONDON OR ELSEWHERE. HE LIKENED PRESENT SITUATION TO PERIOD AFTER ABORTIVE MARCH, 1975 SHUTTLE WHEN A SADAT/FORD

MEETING IN SALZBURG ENABLED NEGOTIATIONS TO BE RESUMED LEADING TO SINAI II. IF HIS PLAN COMMENDS ITSELF TO US, EGYPTIAN WEST BANK/GAZA COUNTERPROPOSAL MIGHT BE DELIVERED TO ISRAELIS AFTER VP MONDALE VISIT TO TEL AVIV. IT WILL SURELY BE REJECTED AND EACH SIDE WILL THEN HAVE REJECTED THE PROPOSAL OF THE OTHER. THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCE FOR NEW USG INITIATIVE. I CAUTIONED PRESIDENT CARTER'S TIGHT SCHEDULE MAY NOT ALLOW SUCH MEETING. SADAT SAID HE UNDERSTANDS. IF PRESIDENT CARTER DOES NOT CONSIDER SUCH A PRIOR MEETING POSSIBLE, HE WILL AGREE TO A KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING ON BASIS OF AN INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT CARTER AS INITIALLY PROPOSED. SADAT CLEARLY ANXIOUS FOR A BRIEF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER BEFORE PROCEEDING. PLEASE ADVISE. END SUMMARY.

2. AS PREARRANGED, I FLEW TO ALEXANDRIA THIS MORNING ABOARD VP MUBARAK'S AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO MEET WITH SADAT. DURING THE FLIGHT, I TOLD MUBARAK ABOUT FONMIN KAMEL'S ASSERTION THAT SADAT MAY HAVE CHANGED HIS MIND RE KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING AND ASKED IF THIS IS SO. MUBARAK SAID THAT AFTER HE HAD PHONED ME A FEW DAYS AGO TO SAY THAT SADAT STILL AGREES TO SUCH A MEETING, THE PRESIDENT HAD A FURTHER TALK WITH MUBARAK AND KAMEL ABOUT THE MATTER. AS A RESULT OF THAT TALK, AND ON BASIS KAMEL'S CONCERN, SADAT NOW BELIEVES THERE
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SHOULD BE SOME "IN-BETWEEN" STEP BETWEEN ISRAELI RESPONSES AND MEETING WE PROPOSE. HE DID NOT ELABORATE.

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN I ARRIVED AT MAMOURA, I FOUND SADAT CLOSETED WITH MUBARAK AND KAMEL. AHMED MAHER, WHO WAS WAITING OUTSIDE, TOLD ME THAT KAMEL WAS BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT ABOUT OUR TALK OF YESTERDAY (REF B). AFTER ABOUT A 20-MINUTE WAIT, I WAS ASKED TO JOIN THE GROUP. ALTHOUGH I KNEW KAMEL HAD²483*3\$ 5#3 043 8\$3,5, I THOUGHT IT BEST TO GIVE SADAT DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSED SCENARIO IN ORDER TO BE SURE THAT THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING AND IN CASE HE HAD ANY QUESTIONS. I THEN WENT THROUGH IT IN DETAIL, NOTING WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED KAMEL'S SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO PROCEED. THE IDEA THAT SECRETARY VANCE SHOULD FIRST COME OUT DID NOT COMMEND ITSELF TO US, SINCE WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL PRODUCE ANY POSITIVE RESULTS. WE HAVE, HOWEVER, SOUGHT TO ACCOMMODATE EGYPTIAN IDEA ABOUT TIMING BY DEFERRING PROPOSED KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS, I.E., JULY 10-12. AS SADAT WOULD RECOGNIZE, OUR SCENARIO IS BASED UPON A CONCEPT HE HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED TO US AND IS TAILORED TO THE PARTICULAR SITUATION WE ALL

FIND OURSELVES IN. I EMPHASIZED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER CONSIDERS SUCH A KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO ENABLE US TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE. HE, PRESIDENT SADAT, KNEW THE REASONS FOR THIS FROM OUR EARLIER EXCHANGES. SINCE WE BELIEVE SADAT SHARES THE VIEW THAT THERE IS SOME URGENCY IN REVITALIZING THE PEACE PROCESS, I HOPED HE COULD TODAY GIVE HIS AGREEMENT TO OUR PROPOSED SCENARIO.

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4. SADAT HEARD ME OUT WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING. AT THAT POINT, KAMEL INTERVENED TO REITERATE HIS CONCERN ABOUT WHAT SUCH A MEETING WILL DISCUSS. WHAT WILL BE THE OUT-COME? EGYPTIAN IMAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD, HE STATED, IS ALREADY TARNISHED AND A KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING IMMEDIATELY ON THE HEELS OF THE NEGATIVE ISRAELI RESPONSES WILL NOT BE UNDERSTOOD. IT WILL SUBJECT GOE TO SEVERE ARAB CENSURE, EVEN FROM FRIENDS. I AGAIN MADE THE POINT THAT THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON THE WEST BANK/GAZA WOULD BE DISCUSSED. I REMINDED SADAT OF OUR TALK AT MIT ABUL KUM (MUBARAK WAS PRESENT) DURING WHICH SADAT HAD ASKED THAT A SERIES OF "QUESTIONS" BE DRAFTED FOR USE WITH THE ISRAELIS WHEN THEIR REPLIES WERE IN ON THE TWO QUESTIONS WE HAD POSED TO THEM. KAMEL ASSERTED THAT IF THE EXERCISE IS GOING TO BE ONE OF PUTTING MORE QUESTIONS TO THE ISRAELIS, THEY WILL AGAIN TAKE MANY MONTHS TO ANSWER. I SAID OUR IDEA IS NOT TO HAVE THE PARTIES SUBMIT QUESTIONS TO EACH OTHER FOR PROTRACTED STUDY AND REPLY. OUR CONCEPT IS THAT EACH PARTY WILL HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE OTHER ON A WEST BANK/GAZA SETTLEMENT AND THAT THESE CAN BE

ASKED AND DISCUSSED DURING THE TALKS. KAMEL DID NOT PURSUE HIS POINT. I ALSO NOTED OUR WILLINGNESS GO TO BAT WITH SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS TO SUPPORT (OR AT LEAST SECRET

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NOT TO ATTACK) SUCH MEETING.

5. SADAT THEN SPOKE FOR THE FIRST TIME. HE RECALLED THAT IT WAS HE WHO HAD TOLD ME AN INITIATIVE BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO CONVENE A KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING OUTSIDE OF EGYPT WOULD BE AGREEABLE. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUCH A MEETING, THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED, IS THEREFORE NOT RPT NOT IN DISPUTE, ALTHOUGH HE HAD TO TELL ME AT THE OUTSET THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT WISH TO GIVE ME A DEFINITIVE GOE ANSWER TODAY. THE NEGATIVE ISRAELI RESPONSE, SADAT CONTINUED, HAS CREATED A NEW SITUATION. THE ENTIRE WORLD IS DISTURBED BY THE ISRAELI ANSWERS AND VIEWS THEM AS NEGATIVE. EVEN SENATOR JAVITS, WHO REGULARLY SUPPORTS ISRAEL, HAS CRITICIZED THE ANSWERS. KAMEL'S POINT ABOUT THE LIKELY NEGATIVE REACTION OF THE ARAB WORLD TO GOE AGREEING TO A KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE UNSATISFACTORY ISRAELI RESPONSES IS TRUE AND HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WHAT IS NEEDED, SADAT ASSERTED, IS SOME DRAMATIC "IN-BETWEEN" STEP WHICH WILL GIVE NEW MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND PROVIDE A PEG ON WHICH EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT CAN BE HUNG.

6. I NOTED THIS COULD BE HUNG ON PRESIDENT CARTER'S INVITATION. SADAT AGREED, BUT SAID SOMETHING MORE DRAMATIC IS NEEDED. HE THEN RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL BE IN BONN BETWEEN JULY 13 AND 27. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE, SADAT WONDERED, TO ARRANGE A BRIEF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IN, SAY, AUSTRIA OR ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE DURING THAT PERIOD? SADAT SAID HE WOULD GREATLY WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT CARTER FOR A FEW HOURS AT ANY PLACE THAT THE LATTER MAY FIND CONVENIENT. IF DESIRED, HE WAS SURE SECRET

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THAT HE COULD ARRANGE WITH KREISKY THAT THE REQUISITE INVITATIONS BE ISSUED. SUCH A MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE EITHER AT THE BEGINNING, DURING OR AT THE END OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S EUROPEAN TRIP. OUT OF IT WOULD COME SADAT'S AGREEMENT, AT PRESIDENT CARTER'S BEHEST, TO HAVE KAMEL MEET WITH DAYAN IN LONDON OR ANYWHERE ELSE

THAT WE MIGHT SUGGEST.

7. SADAT LIKENED THE PRESENT SITUATION TO THAT EXISTING AFTER THE ABORTIVE MARCH, 1975 PEACE SHUTTLE WHEN, IN ORDER TO GET THE PROCESS STARTED AGAIN WITH SUFFICIENT DRAMA, A MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND PRESIDENT FORD HAD BEEN ARRANGED IN SALZBURG. OUT OF THAT HAD COME SADAT'S AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE THE PEACE EFFORT, WHICH HAD ULTIMATELY RESULTED IN SINAI II. SADAT NOTED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS TODAY IN A CONSIDERABLY STRONGER POSITION THAN PRESIDENT FORD WAS AT THAT TIME.

8. IF THIS IDEA COMMENDS ITSELF TO PRESIDENT CARTER, SADATHXFGESTED THAT THE EGYPTIAN WEST BANK/GAZA COUNTERPROPOSAL MIGHT BE DELIVERED TO THE ISRAELIS SHORTLY AFTER VP MONDALE'S VISIT TO TEL AVIV. HE ASSUMED THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL REJECT IT. EACH SIDE WILL THEN HAVE REJECTED THE PROPOSAL OF THE OTHER. IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION, A RENEWED USG INITIATIVE WOULD SEEM NATURAL AND APPROPRIATE. SUCH AN INITIATIVE, HE REITERATED, COULD BE A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS. SADAT REPEATEDLY MADE THE POINT THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A FEW HOURS TALK WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. AS HE VIEWED IT, THIS WILL GIVE NEW MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND SPOTLIGHT IT. I SAID THAT I KNEW PRESIDENT CARTER'S HIGH RESPECT AND REGARD FOR

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SADAT AND THAT PRESIDENT CARTER ALWAYS ENJOYS THEIR MEETINGS. I WOULD, OF COURSE, SUBMIT HIS IDEA, BUT I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER PRESIDENT CARTER'S ALREADY BUSY SCHEDULE WILL PERMIT SUCH A MEETING.

PRESIDENT CARTER'S SCHEDULE IS FIXED MONTHS IN ADVANCE AND I HOPED PRESIDENT SADAT WOULD UNDERSTAND IF THE ANSWER IS THAT, REGRETTABLY, SUCH A MEETING SIMPLY CANNOT BE FITTED INTO PRESIDENT CARTER'S TIGHT SCHEDULE.

9. SADAT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND THAT IF HIS PROPOSED MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER IS NOT CONVENIENT, HE WILL AGREE THAT KAMEL MEET WITH DAYAN SIMPLY ON THE BASIS OF AN INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT CARTER AS WE HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED. HE MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS NOT HIS PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE. HE ASKED THAT I ADVISE KAMEL OF OUR REPLY ONCE RECEIVED.

10. COMMENT. SADAT, LIKE KAMEL, SEEMS TO HAVE BECOME PERSUADED THAT AGREEING TO A KAMEL/DAYAN MEETING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE NEGATIVE ISRAELI RESPONSES WILL RESULT IN ARAB CENSURE. HE IS NOT GOING BACK ON HIS COMMITMENT TO SUCH A MEETING, BUT WANTS SOME DRAMATIC "IN-BETWEEN" STEP ON WHICH TO AGREE TO A DIRECT MEETING CAN BE PEGGED AND EXPLAINED TO THE ARABS. I
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ALSO SENSE THAT, BECAUSE OF HIS AND KAMEL'S NAGGING UNEASINESS ABOUT THE NATURE OF ANY USG SUGGESTIONS THAT MAY EVENTUALLY BE PUT FORWARD, HE WOULD AGAIN LIKE TO REASSURE HIMSELF THROUGH A DIRECT MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER ON WHAT WE ARE LIKELY TO PUT FORWARD. IF SUCH A MEETING IS NOT CONVENIENT FOR PRESIDENT CARTER, HE HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT OUR PROPOSED SCENARIO IS ACCEPTABLE. WE WILL HAVE TO TAKE CARE, HOWEVER, TO LET HIM DOWN GENTLY, SINCE HE IS VERY ENAMORED WITH HIS IDEA. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP WHAT REPLY YOU WISH ME GIVE TO SADAT. EILTS

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